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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze contagion over the daily period of January 1, 1998 to
September 13, 2018 between Real Estate Investments Trusts (REITs) and the equity
markets of 19 countries, which are at their different stages of development in terms
of the REITs market. For our purpose, we use the local Gaussian correlation
approach during the dot-com, global financial, European sovereign debt crises and
the more recent period involving the Brexit in the UK. The employed method not
only avoids the bias of the conditional correlation, but also describes any nonlinear
structure in dependence and the deviation from global normality. In general, we find
strong evidence of nonlinear contagion between equities and REITs of not only
matured and established markets, but also in economies with an emerging REITs
sector, especially during the global financial and sovereign debt crises. Further, when
we considered contagion across REITs of the US and the other countries, and between
US REITs and equities of the remaining 18 countries, a similar pattern emerges. Our
results have important implications for investors and policymakers alike.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In the wake of extreme events that unfolded in the world-
wide financial markets during the recent global financial
and the European sovereign debt crises, there has been a
renewed interest among researchers to better understand
contagion, whereby, loosely speaking, contagion can be
defined as a rapid shock spillover that increases cross-
market linkages.1 There exists large number of (earlier and
recent) studies on contagion (surrounding older and newer
crises episodes) involving bonds, stocks, currencies, commodi-
ties and more recently, hedge funds (see e.g., Pericoli &
Sbracia, 2003; Tai, 2004, Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, &
Martin, 2005; Pesaran & Pick, 2007; Forbes, 2012; Mollah,
Quoreshi, & Zafirov, 2016; Bampinas & Panagiotidis, 2017;
Chuliá, Guillén, & Uribe, 2017; Samarakoon, 2017; and
Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, & Rigobon, 2018 for detailed
reviews). There are some literatures studying on conta-
gion within real estate markets (see e.g., Chang &
Chen, 2014; Fry, Martin, & Tang, 2010; Gerlach,Wilson, &
Zurbruegg, 2006; Guo, Chen, & Huang, 2011; Hoesli &
Reka, 2013; Kallberg, Liu, & Pasquariello, 2002; Liow, Ho,
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Ibrahim, & Chen, 2009; Lu, Tse, & Williams, 2013). In gen-
eral, these studies confirm the existence of contagion in the
United States (US) with the domestic financial market, and
across international real estate markets (like Australia and
the United Kingdom (UK)), during the Asian crisis of 1997
and the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
The benefits of including real estate in mixed-asset port-
folios are now well-recognized (Bouri, Gupta, Wong, &
Zhu, 2018; Hoesli, Lekander, & Witkiewicz, 2004; Mac-
Kinnon & Al Zaman, 2009). However, investing in real
estate can be problematic due to the high unit value and illi-
quidity of properties. Thus, it is not surprising that the
importance of the securitized real estate market, that is, Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), has grown substantially
during the past decades, with a total market capitalization of
US $1.7 trillion (Ernst, & Young, Global Real Estate
Report, 2016). Though the US continues to remain the
leader in REITs, the number of countries now offering
REITs2 as an investment vehicle has almost doubled in the
last 10 years to 37. Given the well-accepted importance of
REITs in investment portfolios now, we aim to extend the
limited literature on contagion involving the real estate sec-
tor of primarily the US, by studying contagion between
REITs and the equity markets of 19 countries. The included
countries, based on data availability, are at their different
stages of development in terms of the REITs market, and
correspond to mature (US), established (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, The Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK) and emerging
(Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Spain and
Turkey) categories (Ernst & Young, 2018). In addition, we
also conduct contagion analyses between US REITs and the
other international REITs, as well as between US REITs and
equity markets of the 18 remaining countries in our sample.
In sum, unlike the existing studies, we provide a more com-
prehensive analysis with a wider international dimension,
which in turn, would allow us to draw better inferences
about contagion involving REITs market.
In terms of the econometric methodology, we study con-
tagion by using the local Gaussian correlation approach
introduced by Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013) in four
periods around the dot-com, global financial, European sov-
ereign debt crises and the more recent period involving the
Brexit in the UK, spanning the daily period of January
1, 1998 to September 13, 2018. Though this framework is
conceptually close to the traditional correlation analysis, it
differs being a dependence measure that is localized and
nonlinear. Unlike linear dependence measures, local
Gaussian correlation not only avoids the bias of the condi-
tional correlation, but also describes any nonlinear struc-
ture in dependence and the deviation from global
normality. In addition, our approach does not suffer from
additional bias that might result from the increased
volatility observed during periods of turmoil. Further, the
method can also capture the asymmetric response associ-
ated with shocks of different magnitudes, as it measures
lower, median and upper tail dependencies. Finally, within
the context of the local Gaussian correlation, we can also
test for contagion by comparing the local correlation of the
stable and the crisis periods based on a bootstrap proce-
dure of Støve, Tjøstheim, and Hufthammer (2014).
There are a number of studies explored the contagion
between real estate and equity markets. For example, Cotter
and Stevenson (2006) employ a multivariate VAR-GARCH
model and document the return and volatility linkage
between REIT sub-sections and equity in the US. Hoesli and
Reka (2015) apply a binomial logit model and find strong evi-
dence of contagion between real estate and financial markets
in the US during 1999–2011. They further provide empirical
evidence of the contagion channels from liquidity dynamics
and investors' sentiment. In terms of Asian markets, Hiang
Liow (2012) use the DCC-GJR-GARCH model to study the
co-movements between real estate and stock and conclude
that their conditional correlation is time-varying in eight
Asian countries over 1995–2009. In contrast to the literature,
our analysis contributes to the existing understanding of con-
tagion between REITs and equities in three ways. First and
foremost, we employ the local Gaussian correlation approach
to study the nonlinear contagion, rather than the linear way
such as in the VAR-GARCH model. This method controls
for various types of biases observed in the contagion litera-
ture due to studies ignoring heteroscedasticity (Forbes &
Rigobon, 2002), nonlinearity (Bae, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2003;
Baur, 2013) and asymmetry (Bodart & Candelon, 2009).
Second, we study the contagion from a global perspective,
involving 19 countries with different developed stage in dif-
ferent continents, while existing literature tend to focus on
the US market or other single continent. Lastly, we investi-
gate the contagion surrounding the four extreme events of
last two decades. To be specific, we revisit and update our
understanding on the contagion (in a nonlinear way) dur-
ing the dot-com, global financial, European sovereign debt
crises and the more recent period involving the Brexit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the basics of the methodology of local Gauss-
ian correlation. Section 3 shows the data and illustrate how
we select the periods of study. Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 | METHODOLOGY
2.1 | Local Gaussian correlation
The objective of this paper is to investigate the depen-
dence structure in the pairs involving REITs and equity
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returns, and whether a contagion existed in those two
markets during four different periods. It is not legitimate
to use the standard correlation approach because: (a) the
correlation is primarily meaningful under the Gaussian
assumption; and (b) the correlation can only capture the
linear dependence. There are many empirical evidence
against the Gaussianity of the financial returns and indeed
non-Gaussianity is one of the stylized fact of the daily
financial returns (Bulla & Bulla, 2006; Liu & Wang, 2017;
Rydén, Teräsvirta, & Åsbrink, 1998). Additionally, the
dependence between REIT and equity returns has also
been found to be nonlinear (Hoesli & Reka, 2013, 2015; Li,
Chang, Miller, Balcilar, & Gupta, 2015).
In this regard, Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013)
proposed a new approach called local Gaussian correla-
tion to measure the local dependence and reveal the full
dependence structure. The central idea of the new
approach is to approximate an arbitrary bivariate return
distribution with a family of Gaussian bivariate distribu-
tions. At each point of return distribution, there is a
Gaussian distribution that approximates that point
(approximating the density locally rather than the corre-
lation). The correlation of the approximating Gaussian
distribution is taken as the local correlation in that
neighbourhood.
Given two i.i.d. random variables, u and v, the bivari-
ate density f(x, y) at the location point (x, y) can be
approximated by a bivariate Gaussian density
where μ1(x, y), μ2(x, y) are the local means of u and v,
σ1(x, y), σ2(x, y) are the local standard deviation, and ρ(x, y)
is the local Gaussian correlation.
The five parameters μ1(x, y), μ2(x, y), σ1(x, y), σ2(x, y),
ρ(x, y) are the functions depending on the location point
(x, y), and thus Φx,y is able to approximate the density
function f(x, y) only in a neighbourhood of (x, y). Given
another location point (x0, y0), it is thus necessary to find
another Gaussian Φx0,y0 to get close to the density func-
tion f(x0, y0) in a neighbourhood of (x0, y0). Moving the
location point to all possible regimes of u and v, we can
complete the full approximation for the bivariate density
by a family of bivariate Gaussian densities. Since the local
Gaussian correlation ρ(x, y) captures the dependence in a
neighbourhood of (x, y), the collection of all local Gauss-
ian correlations can fully reveal the dependence structure
between the underlying two random variables. Such a
way of studying dependence structure is flexible in that it
can capture the nonlinear dependence and it is free of
the Gaussian assumption on the underlying variables.
Additionally, it is robust than the conditional correlation
approach.
To implement the local Gaussian approach, it is nec-
essary to employ an appropriate method to fit a Gaussian
density in a neighbourhood of (x, y). In the literature,
Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013) and Støve et al. (2014)
suggested that the local likelihood method developed by
Hjort and Jones (1996) is adequate in fulfilling this task.
One essentially issue is that the local Gaussian correla-
tion estimator ρ̂ x,yð Þ is based on the two kernel smooth-
ing devices with the arbitrary choice of bandwidth
h = (h1, h2), which needs to be specified by the user.
Interested readers can refer to the cited publication for
technical details.
2.2 | Marginal model
It is crucial to ensure that the assumption of i.i.d. is satis-
fied in order to use the local Gaussian approach (Støve
et al., 2014). As a matter of fact, financial returns have
heteroskedasticity, and the typical way is to apply
GARCH-family models to capture the dynamics in the
volatility (Bollerslev, Chou, & Kroner, 1992; Nyakabawo,
Gupta, & Marfatia, 2018). Additionally, there could be
weak dependence in the mean of financial returns via an
ARMA structure (Wei, 2006). Overall, the marginal
model of returns is specified as an ARMA(p1, q1)
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where Rk,t = 100 × {log(Pk,t) − log(Pk,t − 1)}, Pk,t is the
price of REIT or equity at time t, and ηk,t is the standard-
ized residuals which follows the Student-t distribution
with υk degrees of freedom. The computed standardized
residuals from the selected model are consequently used
in the following analysis. The maximum of ARMA lags
p1 and q1 are capped at 5 and the maximum of GARCH
lags p2 and q2 are capped at 2. In order to find the most
appropriate lag lengths for p1, q1, p2, q2, we employ a
sequential search procedure detailed in Appendix A.
To empirically check the i.i.d. assumption (at least no
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity), we consider three
diagnosis tests3 developed by Fisher and Gallagher (2012) on
the standardized residuals. Specifically, we apply the
weighted Ljung-Box test to examine the hypothesis of no
serial correlation. We also use the weighted Ljung-Box test on
squared standardized residuals and the weighted ARCH-LM
test to check the hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. If the
standardized residuals from the ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH
(2, 2) fails to pass any one of the tests at the significance level
(5%), then no marginal model is deemed to be adequate.
2.3 | Bootstrap test for contagion
Støve et al. (2014) developed a bootstrap test for contagion
based on the local Gaussian approach. We briefly summa-
rized this method here. Denote that {R1,t, R2,t}, t = 1, …, T
as the pair of the log returns of REITs and equity indices.
To ensure the i.i.d. assumption of the local Gaussian
approach, we apply the ARMA-GARCH model to filter the
log returns, and extract the standardized residuals {η1,t, η2,
t}, t = 1, …, T. Then, the standardized residuals are split
into two subperiods, the period before the crisis (denoted
as BP) and the period after it (denoted as AP).
According to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), a contagion
can be defined as a significant increase in cross-market
linkages after a shock to one market (or a group of mar-
kets). Following the logic, a contagion is believed to
occur if the local correlation function in the BP is signifi-
cantly above the local correlation function in the
AP. Hence, the contagion test is formulated as follows:
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where (xi, yi) are the selected location points where the
local correlations are estimated. For the choice of the
location points, we follow Støve et al. (2014) and use a
diagonal grid, that is, xi = yi in order to reduce the com-
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where w(xi, xi) is a weight function such that the distance
between the grid points and the observations is not too
large.
However, the proposed test statistic has a non-
analytical asymptotic distribution. In order to obtain the
p-value of the test, Støve et al. (2014) suggested to use the
following bootstrap procedure:
Step 1. Randomly draw samples from the standard-
ized residuals {η1,t, η2,t} with replacement
Step 2. Split the resampled data into BP and AP and
compute ρ̂AP xi,xið Þ and ρBP xi,yið Þ






ρ̂BP xi,xið Þ− ρ̂AP xi,xið Þ
 
w xi,xið Þ: ð8Þ
Repeat Step 1 to Step 3 for a large number of times, B,
and collect all bootstrapped statistics D*. Finally, the p-
value of the test can be found by comparing D in terms of
the distribution of bootstrapped statistics D*, and a deci-
sion of rejecting H0 can be made if it is below a given sig-
nificant level α.
In this regard, the following practical settings were
used: (a) For the bandwidth, we follow Støve et al. (2014)
to choose the bandwidth using a simple rule of thumb –
the global standard deviation times a constant close to
one; (b) The number of repetition times in the bootstrap
test is set to be B = 1,000; (c) The diagonal grid is set to
be between −2.5 and 2.5 with step-size 0.05; and (d) Our
implementation is based on the R package “localgauss”
(Berentsen, Kleppe, & Tjøstheim, 2014).4
3 | DATA
Our analysis involves two variables namely, the REITs
and stock indices of 19 economies (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, UK, and US) cov-
ering the daily period of January 1, 1998 to September
13, 2018. The data is sourced from the DataStream data-
base of Thomson Reuters, with the real estate data
corresponding to the S&P REITs indices for each country,
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while the stock market data are the MSCI indices. Nota-
bly, our data set is obtained already in a cleaned-form
from the source and does not suffer from any problems
such as stale quotes, liquidity issues, missing values and
outliers. Given this, the data does not bias the economet-
ric estimations and thus does not adversely affect infer-
ence. To avoid the impact of exchange rate movements,
both the REITs and stock indices for each country are in
US dollar terms. As pointed out earlier, we work with
log-returns of these two series. However, the starting date
of REITs varies, and not all countries have data available
for REITs back in 1998, unlike the equity market data.
Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix B of the paper provides
the individual sample period of each country (for REITs
and stock returns) and also summarizes the basic statisti-
cal properties of the data. As can be seen, what stands
out is the non-normality of the all the raw log-returns
series based on the strong rejection of the null of normal-
ity under the Jarque-Bera test.
There is plenty of evidence towards large structural
changes5 on those two markets over the last two decades.
Thus, we turn our attention to the local Gaussian
approach for the investigation of the dependence struc-
ture and the existence of contagion between the REIT
return and equity returns during four different periods:
Period 1 (dot-com crisis), Period 2 (global financial crisis),
Period 3 (European sovereign debt crisis), and Period
4 (Recent, or Brexit in the UK). The contagion is analysed
in the context of cross-markets within a country, cross-
country relative to the US within the REITs sector, and
cross-market-cross-country, whereby we look at US equi-
ties and REITs of the remaining 18 countries.
We identify the chronology of the different crisis
periods from the literature. The timeline of the dot-com
crisis and global financial crisis follows Phillips, Wu, and
Yu (2011). The period surrounding the dot-com crisis
covers January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2002, with the
before-crisis sub-period spanning January 1, 1998 to
March 10, 2000 and the after-crisis subperiod running
from March 11, 2000 until December 31, 2002. As also
suggested by Støve et al. (2014), in terms of the global
financial crisis due to the subprime mortgage turmoil, we
define the before-crisis subperiod to be from January
1, 2005 to August 8, 2007 and the after-crisis subperiod
ranging between August 9, 2007 and August 7, 2009. Fol-
lowing Bampinas and Panagiotidis (2015), the European
sovereign debt crisis starts from October 24, 2007 and
ends at July 31, 2012, and the cutting date for before-
crisis and after-crisis subperiods is October 4, 2009
(i.e., elections in Greece). Finally, we also include a
recent period from Jan 1, 2014 to September 13, 2018
(corresponding to the last day of our data sample).
Within this period, one of the major events is the Brexit,
that is, the voting result of the British Referendum on
withdrawing its membership from the European Union,
as announced on June 23, 2016. Thus, we use this date as
the cutting line to distinguish the before-crisis and after-
crisis subperiods in Period 4. This also allows us to have
more than 2 years of data in the sub-period after the
announcement of the Brexit vote result.
As a motivating illustration, we present and discuss
the standard correlation (i.e., Pearson's correlation coeffi-
cient) of our data, before the formal analysis based on the
local Gaussian correlation. Table B3 in the Appendix B
shows the Pearson's correlation between REITs and
equity market returns within a specific country. The exis-
tence of contagion might be determined by an increase of
the Pearson's correlation in a certain period, but there are
three drawbacks in terms of using the Pearson's correla-
tion for determining contagion in our empirical data.
First, the Pearson's correlation is primarily meaningful
for normally distributed data, while the returns of REITs
and equities are highly non-normal, as shown in
Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix. Second, a contagion
can still occur even there is no change in the Pearson's
correlation. For instance, the Pearson's correlation in
South Africa remained the same (0.77) in Period 3, while
there is strong evidence for the contagion based on the
local Gaussian approach, shown in Section 4. This is
because the Pearson's correlation is limited to capture the
linear dependence and cannot take nonlinear depen-
dence into account. Third, the Pearson's correlation is
defined in terms of moments and cannot reveal the infor-
mation in the tails of distribution, while the local Gauss-
ian approach can provide the “full picture” over the
entire distribution by inspecting the local Gaussian corre-
lation curves.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our empirical results are organized in three sets. The first
set investigates the contagion between REITs and equity
within one country. The second set focus on the US
REITs and examines its contagion with REITs in other
countries. The third set explores the contagion between
US REITs with equity in other countries. In this way, we
provide “multi-dimensional” insights in the contagion
between the two markets in different countries.
4.1 | (Cross-market) Contagion between
REITs and equity
We start our analysis by investigating the cross-market
local Gaussian correlation between returns of the REITs
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and equity markets for each country. For the sake of
brevity, we concentrate on Table 1, which presents the
bootstrap test of contagion for the 19 counties in the four
periods. It must be noted that results are available for all
or certain periods depending on data availability of the
REITs.
For the US, the bootstrap test indeed shows that there
is significant evidence of contagion that occurred
between REITs and equity in Period 1 and 2, while there
is no evidence of contagion in periods 3 and 4. As demon-
stration, Figure 1 shows the (nonlinear) local Gaussian
correlation curves between REITs and equity returns of
the US in each of the four periods. In Period 1 (dot-com
crisis), there is a substantial increase of the local Gauss-
ian correlation from −0.03 to 0.34 in the right tail after
the crisis, while there is only a slight increment in the left
tail and the middle regime of the distribution. The global
financial crisis is also observed to have significantly
increased the linkage between the US REITs and US
equity in Period 2. The European sovereign debt crisis
and Brexit occurred in Europe and have small impact on
the US market, and we observe that the local Gaussian
correlation curve decreased after the crisis in periods
3 and 4. Barring the initial pre-dot-com crisis period, with
the correlation between REITs and stock returns always
being positive, tends to suggest that diversification oppor-
tunities are considerably reduced across securitized real
estate and equity markets in the US during periods of tur-
moil, irrespective of whether these markets are in bearish
(lower tail), normal (median), or bullish (upper tail)
phases.6 The lack of contagion in the US during Period
3 and 4 can be explained in the following way. REITs in
the US are mainly investing in commercial real estate
(except for Mortgage REITs). Although the US residential
housing markets were slowly recovering from subprime
crisis, commercial real estate was not negatively affected
as severe as residential ones. Thus, the lack of contagion
in the US may not related to the European debt crisis or
TABLE 1 p-values of the bootstrap test between REITs and equity returns in the same country
Country Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
United States 1.60% 0.10% 94.71% 100.00%
Australia 69.03% 0.80% 0.60% 100.00%
Belgium 19.48% 9.19% 0.10% 25.47%
Canada 92.81% 0.10% 0.70% 72.03%
France — 0.10% 0.10% 100.00%
Germany — — 3.50% 93.91%
Hong Kong — 0.10% 100.00% 55.34%
Japan — 0.30% 97.30% 36.96%
The Netherlands 37.16% 0.10% 0.10% 96.30%
New Zealand  0.40% 94.71% 97.40%
Singapore — 0.10% 96.80% 92.31%
United Kingdom — — 0.10% 99.10%
Ireland — — — /
Italy — — — 85.71%
Malaysia — —  100.00%
Mexico — — — 0.70%
South Africa — — 0.30% /
Spain — — — 0.50%
Turkey — — 46.55% 84.72%
Note: This table shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between REITs and equity market returns within a specific country, that is, cross-
market contagion in a particular country. Strong evidence, that is, p-values less than 5% is highlighted in red background, and weak evidence
implied by p-values between 5 and 10% is highlighted in yellow background. The symbol “—” denotes no available data in that period; the
symbol “” denotes the non-convergence of the local Gaussian approach; and the symbol “/” denote that no adequate ARMA-GARCH could
be obtained for the marginal model. The chronology of the four periods are denoted as: Period 1 (dot-com crisis; before: Jan 1, 1998–Mar 10,
2000; after: Mar 11, 2000–Dec 31, 2002), Period 2 (global financial crisis; before: Jan 1, 2005–Aug 8, 2007; after: Aug 9, 2007–Aug 7, 2009),
Period 3 (European sovereign debt crisis; before: Oct 24, 2007–Oct 4, 2009; after: Oct 5, 2009–Jul 31, 2012), and Period 4 (Recent, or Brexit in
the UK; before: Jan 1, 2014–Jun 23, 2016; after: Jun 24, 2016–Sep 13, 2018).
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FIGURE 1 Local Gaussian correlation curves between REITs and equity returns in the US in four periods: Period 1 (upper-left); Period
2 (upper-right); Period 3 (lower-left); and Period 4 (lower-right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Local Gaussian
correlation curves between
REITs and equity returns in
South Africa for the third period
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Brexit because REITs' investing in commercial real estate
offer the inflation-free and high tax-efficient returns.
As for other countries, that is, the established markets
of Australia, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, The
Netherlands, New Zealand and Singapore, for which
REITs data is available, there is strong evidence of conta-
gion for almost all countries during the global financial
crisis. For Belgium, weak evidence is observed at the 10%
level of significance. In terms of the European sovereign
debt crisis (Period 3), not surprisingly all the European
countries for which REITs data is available, that is, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, The Netherlands and the UK,
we observe strong evidence of contagion. In addition,
contagion across real estate and equity markets are also
observed in Australia, Canada and the emerging market
of South Africa, which could be a result of the equity and
REITs markets in these economies being affected by a
common factor, that is, global slowdown (“double-dip”
following the “Great Recession” of 2008) due to this
shock in the sovereign bonds market.
Given that South Africa has a relatively well-
functioning REITs sector among the emerging markets
(Akinsomi, Balcilar, Demirer, & Gupta, 2017), in
Figure 2, we plot the (nonlinear) local Gaussian correla-
tion curve for South Africa, as a representative of emerg-
ing REITs markets. As can be seen there is strong
evidence of contagion in the post European sovereign
debt crisis episode, and with the Gaussian correlation
being positive, indicating that diversification opportuni-
ties are very limited between equities and the securitized
real estate market.7
Interestingly, there is no evidence of contagion in the
UK after the Brexit vote, which in turn, can possibly be
explained by the fact that the negotiations for the process
was still in process during Period 4. Surprisingly, conta-
gion is observed in the two emerging markets of Mexico
and Spain, likely due to the fact that REITs as an alterna-
tive and new investment instrument in these two econo-
mies got introduced during this period, and was
relatively more susceptible to negative news shocks.
TABLE 2 p-values of the bootstrap test between US REITs and REITs of other countries
Country Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Australia 66.13% 8.59% 1.00% 41.36%
Belgium 4.00% 0.10% 1.50% 46.65%
Canada 86.11% 0.10% 12.59% 65.93%
France — 0.10% 1.00% 57.64%
Germany — — 6.69% 64.44%
Hong Kong — 24.98% 10.99% 69.63%
Japan — 75.32% 56.84% 1.50%
The Netherlands 15.18% 0.30% 0.30% 97.00%
New Zealand  0.90% 3.50% 22.38%
Singapore — 3.70% 8.99% 33.07%
United Kingdom — — 2.50% 86.81%
Ireland — — — 52.35%
Italy — — — 56.34%
Malaysia — —  78.12%
Mexico — — — 45.15%
South Africa — — 3.30% /
Spain — — — 
Turkey — — 21.08% 92.01%
Note: This table shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between US REITs and REITs in other countries, that is, cross-country contagion for
the REITs sector. Strong evidence, that is, p-values less than 5% is highlighted in red background, and weak evidence implied by p-values
between 5 and 10% is highlighted in yellow background. The symbol “—” denotes no available data in that period; the symbol “” denotes
the non-convergence of the local Gaussian approach; and the symbol “/” denote that no adequate ARMA-GARCH could be obtained for the
marginal model. The chronology of the four periods are denoted as: Period 1 (dot-com crisis; before: Jan 1, 1998–Mar 10, 2000; after: Mar 11,
2000–Dec 31, 2002), Period 2 (global financial crisis; before: Jan 1, 2005–Aug 8, 2007; after: Aug 9, 2007–Aug 7, 2009), Period 3 (European
sovereign debt crisis; before: Oct 24, 2007–Oct 4, 2009; after: Oct 5, 2009–Jul 31, 2012), and Period 4 (Recent, or Brexit in the UK; before: Jan
1, 2014–Jun 23, 2016; after: Jun 24, 2016–Sep 13, 2018).
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4.2 | (Cross-country) Contagion between
US REITs and REITs of other countries
We proceed with our analysis by studying the cross-
country linkage in the REITs markets, that is, the US
with other countries, given the dominance of the former
in the REITs sector (as indicated by the NAREIT: the
worldwide representative voice for REITs)8 and the
global economy in general. Table 2 presents the bootstrap
test of contagion between US REITs and the REITs in the
other 18 countries in the four periods. In the dot-com cri-
sis, the contagion only took place between US and Bel-
gium. In terms of the global financial crisis, we find
strong evidence of contagion between US and Canada,
and also between US and most established European
markets except for Germany and the UK. While there is
weak evidence between US and Australia, the effect is
strong for New Zealand and Singapore. Contagion during
the European sovereign debt crisis is observed between
the US with Australia, France, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, South Africa and the UK, with weak
effects on Germany and Singapore. Interestingly, the
contagion between US and Japan is found to be signifi-
cant in Period 4.
To analyze nonlinear contagion between the
mature US REITs market with the established Cana-
dian securitized real estate sector, we present in
Figure 3 the (nonlinear) local Gaussian correlation cur-
ves between US and Canada during the four different
periods. In Period 1, the local Gaussian correlation
curve drops after the burst of the dot-com bubble, but
there is a rise in the local Gaussian correlation curve
after the subprime mortgage crisis, especially in the
middle regime of the distribution, but the increment in
the right tail is marginal. Conversely and interestingly,
there is a surge in the right tail of the local Gaussian
correlation curve in the third period, while the curve
keeps the similar level in the middle regime and left
tail. Subsequently, the high local Gaussian correlation
in the right tail dropped in Period 4. But more impor-
tantly, with the correlation being positive in all periods
between REITs returns across the North American bor-
ders, imply that inter-country diversification benefits
are very limited.
FIGURE 3 Local Gaussian correlation curves between the US and Canadian REITs in four periods: Period 1 (upper-left); Period
2 (upper-right); Period 3 (lower-left); and Period 4 (lower-right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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In order to demonstrate the linkage in the REITs
markets of the US and Europe, Figure 4 presents the
(nonlinear) local Gaussian correlation curves with the
Netherlands, as an example. We choose the Nether-
lands, as the bootstrap test had provided strong evi-
dence of significance during the periods spanning the
global financial and sovereign debt crises. For periods
1, 2 and 3, we observe higher local Gaussian correla-
tion estimates for the majority of the distribution,
although in periods 1 and 2 the curves cross each other
at the upper tail, which in turn could have made the
contagion insignificant during the dot-com crisis.
There is an obvious shrinkage of local Gaussian corre-
lation in Period 4. Barring the lower-tail, that is, bear-
ish state of the REITs markets during the dot-com
crisis, any possibility of diversification benefit seems to
have frittered away during the recent episodes of finan-
cial market crises. The consistent evidence of lack of
diversification benefits relative to the US REITs
market,9 especially during recent periods, is an indica-
tion of the integration in the REITs market across the
world, that is, they are driven by common shocks
(Bardhan, Edelstein, & Tsang, 2008; Ji, Marfatia, &
Gupta, 2018).
4.3 | (Cross-market-cross-country)
Contagion between US REITs and equity
markets of other countries
Again given the dominance of the US real estate sector,
malfunctioning of which basically led to the global finan-
cial crisis, there could be contagion between US REITs
and equity markets in other countries, that is, cross-mar-
ket-cross-country contagion. Hence, we now study the
local Gaussian correlation between US REITs and equity
markets in the other 18 countries during the four period.
Table 3 exhibits the bootstrap test of contagion between
US REITs and the equity in the other 18 countries in the
four periods. During the dot-com crisis, strong evidence
of contagion for equity markets is observed in the three
European countries of France, Germany and Italy, with
weak evidence for Canada and Mexico. In terms of the
global finance crisis, the bootstrap test suggests that
FIGURE 4 Local Gaussian correlation curves between REITs of the US and the Netherlands in four periods: Period 1 (upper-left);
Period 2 (upper-right); Period 3 (lower-left); and Period 4 (lower-right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
10 BOURI ET AL.
contagion from US REITs is significant for the equity
markets in the majority of countries (with weak effects in
France, Germany, Italy and Singapore), except for
New Zealand and the three Asian countries of Hong
Kong, Japan and Malaysia. All the mainland European
countries (with weak effect on the Netherlands), Ireland
and the UK, other than Italy, shows evidence of conta-
gion in their equity market with the US REITs market
during the sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, we also
observe strong evidence of contagion in Australia,
Canada, Singapore and South Africa in Period 3, with
weak affects also observed for New Zealand. Lastly, there
is no strong evidence of contagion in the equity markets
of any other 18 countries in the recent period, barring a
weak impact on Australia.
To reflect the cross-market-cross-country linkages, we
display the local Gaussian correlation curves between US
REITs and equity market of the UK in Figure 5. Period
1 is shown to exhibit an interesting pattern, in the sense
that there is a rise in the right tail and a drop in the left
tail, making possibly the overall impact insignificant, as
found in Table 3. We can clearly observe the upward
movement in the local Gaussian correlation curves in both
periods 2 and 3, while there is a reduction in the local
Gaussian curve in the recent period (Period 4). In
Figure 6, we select the pair of US REITs and equity market
of Singapore and present their (nonlinear) local Gaussian
correlation curves for the four periods. In Period 1, there is
a fall of local Gaussian correlation in the right tail of the
distribution. It is intriguing to observe that Period 2 experi-
ences a rise in the middle of the distribution and a reduc-
tion in both tails, resulting in a weak overall effect as
observed in Table 3. There is a universal increase in the
whole distribution in Period 3, especially for the right tail
and the regime between −2 and −1 in the distribution. In
Period 4, the two local Gaussian correlation curves cross
each other. In general again, due to the correlation being
positive across US REITs return and equity return of the
other countries,10 cross-market-cross-country diversifica-
tion, will barely help in improving the profitability of the
portfolio during these periods of global crises. This is possi-
bly due to the fact that though REITs market is indeed
TABLE 3 p-values of the bootstrap test between US REITs and equity markets in other countries
Country Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Australia 31.68% 1.98% 1.98% 8.91%
Belgium 45.54% 0.99% 3.96% 94.06%
Canada 5.94% 0.99% 2.97% 44.55%
France 2.97% 9.90% 4.95% 100.00%
Germany 0.99% 7.92% 1.98% 97.03%
Hong Kong 45.54% 23.76% 28.71% 40.59%
Japan 56.44% 54.46% 13.86% 13.86%
The Netherlands 14.85% 1.98% 9.90% 99.01%
New Zealand 33.66% 11.88% 6.93% 24.75%
Singapore 43.56% 8.91% 2.97% 26.73%
United Kingdom 37.62% 0.99% 1.98% 98.02%
Ireland 12.87% 1.98% 1.98% /
Italy 4.95% 6.93% 14.85% 98.02%
Malaysia 78.22% 49.50% 12.87% 79.21%
Mexico 5.94% 0.99% 84.16% 77.23%
South Africa 62.38% 4.95% 0.99% 38.61%
Spain 32.67% / / 98.02%
Turkey 37.62% 0.99% 51.49% 75.25%
Note: This table shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between US REITs and equity markets in other countries, that is, cross-market-and-
cross-country contagion. Strong evidence, that is, p-values less than 5% is highlighted in red background, and weak evidence implied by p-
values between 5 and 10% is highlighted in yellow background. The symbol “/” denote that no adequate ARMA-GARCH could be obtained
for the marginal model. The chronology of the four periods are denoted as: Period 1 (dot-com crisis; before: Jan 1, 1998–Mar 10, 2000; after:
Mar 11, 2000–Dec 31, 2002), Period 2 (global financial crisis; before: Jan 1, 2005–Aug 8, 2007; after: Aug 9, 2007–Aug 7, 2009), Period 3 (-
European sovereign debt crisis; before: Oct 24, 2007–Oct 4, 2009; after: Oct 5, 2009–Jul 31, 2012), and Period 4 (Recent, or Brexit in the UK;
before: Jan 1, 2014–Jun 23, 2016; after: Jun 24, 2016–Sep 13, 2018).
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associated with the real estate market, characteristically it
is much similar to standard equity markets (Ghysels,
Plazzi, Torous, & Valkanov, 2013).
Since US has the most advanced REITs market, our
analysis in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 focuses on the con-
tagion between US REITs and REITs and equity markets
in other countries. The contagion of other combinations
could also be interesting for some certain periods. For
example, there could be an impact on German REITs
market due to European sovereign debt crisis, and Brexit
may also affect the UK REITs market. Thus, we present
additional results of the bootstrap test of contagion in
Table B4 in the Appendix B, with interests in German
and UK REITs markets.11 Based on the strong evidence
for German REITs market during Period 3, we can
observe that it only had cross-country contagion with
French REITs market, but had cross-market-cross-
country contagion with the equity markets in the major
European countries, such as France, the Netherlands,
UK and Italy. This indicates that the linkage between
German REITs and equity markets in Europe was stron-
ger than the linkage in REITs markets. Based on the test
results for UK in Period 4, we can hardly find any evi-
dence of contagion with either REITs or equity markets
in other economies. Again, this can be possibly explained
by the fact that the negotiations for the deal between UK
and EU was still in process during Period 4.
Overall, there is strong evidence of contagion between
equities and REITs of the 19 countries considered, between
US and other country REITs, and between US REITs and
equities of the remaining 18 countries. The detected evi-
dence of contagion can be explained via three possible theo-
ries of contagion namely, through financial linkages, trade
links, and herding behaviour (Kaminsky, Reinhardt, &
Végh, 2003). The financial linkages theory stipulates that
contagion might occur through three mechanisms: informa-
tion correlation, liquidity correlation and portfolio
rebalancing. The information correlation channel (King &
Wadhwani, 1990) is based on the price discovery process,
which assumes immediate price effects in the markets
affected by a financial collapse elsewhere. The model of
King and Wadhwani (1990) shows that rational agents, by
inferring information from price changes in some markets,
can affect other markets, while the theoretical underpinning
FIGURE 5 Local correlation curves between REITs of the US and equity of the UK in four periods: Period 1 (upper-left); Period
2 (upper-right); Period 3 (lower-left); and Period 4 (lower-right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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for the liquidity correlation channel investigation is provided
by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The authors explain
how liquidity spirals (funding liquidity and asset liquidity
issues self-reinforcing) could emerge and explain a conta-
gion phenomenon. The portfolio rebalancing channel sug-
gests that contagion emerges when agents reallocate their
portfolio in response to large losses in one or several markets
(Kodres & Pritsker, 2002). As we study contagion across var-
ious asset classes in one country, the trade links theory can-
not play any role in the propagation of shocks. In contrast,
the third theory, that is, the herding behaviour theory (corre-
lated trading activities across agents), may influence our
findings, especially given evidence of herding in equity and
REITs markets in the wake of heightened uncertainty,
which is likely to exist during crises (Babalos, Balcilar, &
Gupta, 2015; Balcilar & Demirer, 2015).
5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study the nonlinear contagion between
REITs and the equity markets of 19 countries, which are
at their different stages of development in terms of the
REITs market. In addition, we also conduct the nonlinear
analyses in contagion between US REITs and the other
international REITs, as well as between US REITs and
equity markets of the 18 remaining countries in our sam-
ple. We analyze contagion by using the local Gaussian
correlation approach during the dot-com, global finan-
cial, European sovereign debt crises and the more recent
period involving the Brexit in the UK, spanning the daily
period of January 1, 1998 to September 13, 2018. In gen-
eral, we find strong evidence of nonlinear contagion
between equities and REITs of not only matured and
established markets, but also in economies with an
emerging REITs sector, especially during the global
financial and sovereign debt crises. Further, when we
considered contagion across REITs of the US and the
other countries, and between US REITs and equities of
the remaining 18 countries, a similar pattern emerges.
These results tend to suggest that REITs and equity mar-
kets within and across economies have become more
integrated post the dot-com crises, to the extent that the
local Gaussian correlations are positive, implying limited
FIGURE 6 Local correlation curves between REITs of the US and equity of Singapore in four periods: Period 1 (upper-left); Period
2 (upper-right); Period 3 (lower-left); and Period 4 (lower-right) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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diversification opportunities for investors. It is suggested
that policymakers should closely monitor contagion of
especially negative shocks emanating from not only
domestic, but also foreign REITs (and equity) markets, as
this is likely to deepen recessions or slowdown the recov-
ery process. Naturally, policy authorities might need to
be proactive with expansionary (monetary) policies to
revive the economy.
Given that REITs markets around the world seem to
have become integrated in recent years, as part of future
research, it would be interesting to obtain common time-
varying components of returns and volatilities following
the procedure of Bhatt, Kishor, and Ma (2017), and then
analyze the factors that drive these comovements. Further,
one could do a similar analysis for equity markets, and
then compare whether the driving factors across REITs
and equity markets are common or not. These would serve
as important information for investors and policymakers
alike. Additionally, we use the bootstrap test for contagion
which detects the existence of contagion in an ex post
manner and can retrospectively reveal the contagion in
this study. It is possible to develop a testing procedure á la
Chu, Stinchcombe, and White (1996) to real-time monitor
the change from non-contagion to contagion. If the conta-
gion can be detected in real-time, it becomes interesting to
study the possible opportunities of trading and arbitrage.
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ENDNOTES
1 The existing literature has recognized at least three possible theo-
ries of contagion, that is, through financial linkages (which in
turn has three channels, that is, information correlation, liquidity
correlation and portfolio rebalancing), trade links, and herding
behaviour (Hoesli & Reka, 2015). We discuss these channels in
greater detail in Section 4 of the paper.
2 REITs are required to follow regulations of individual countries
regarding investment, income distribution and tax treatment.
3 In our case, all our chosen models for the various cases consid-
ered satisfied the i.i.d. assumption. The results of all these tests
are available upon request from the authors and have been
suppressed to save space.
4 We appreciate Bård Støve and Dag Tjøstheim for providing the R
codes of the contagion bootstrap test.
5 In addition to the extreme events of last two decades, we are also
aware that many countries (e.g., UK) have had an established
market of real estate companies that were listed on the stock
exchange but did not have the REIT status at that time.
6 The figures for the local Gaussian curves of all countries for the
various periods can be obtained upon request from the authors.
In general, as in the case of the US, with the correlation being
positive between REITs and stock returns, any possibility of diver-
sification is nullified.
7 Note that, as no adequate ARMA-GARCH framework could be
obtained for the marginal model in the last period, and no data
on REITs is available for the first and the second crises in South
Africa, we are only restricted to the third period of European sov-
ereign debt crisis.
8 See: https://www.reit.com/investing/global-real-estate-investment
9 The figures for the local Gaussian curves of the remaining 16 coun-
tries for the various periods, showing similar positive correlation
patterns in general, are available upon request from the authors.
10 The figures for the local Gaussian curves of the remaining
16 countries for the various periods, depicting positive correla-
tion in general, are available upon request from the authors.
11 Note that there could be small differences in the p-values of the
bootstrap test of contagion between REITs markets in the US,
UK, and Germany, due to the nature of bootstrap procedure.
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APPENDIX A.: SEQUENTIAL SEARCH
PROCEDURE
We elaborate the sequential search procedure to deter-
mine the appropriate orders for ARMA(p1, q1)
− GARCH(p2, q2) in the following. The maximum of
ARMA lags p1 and q1 are capped at 5, that is, p1 ≤ 5,
q1 ≤ 5. The maximum of GARCH lags p2 and q2 are
capped at 2, that is, p2 ≤ 2, q2 ≤ 2. Firstly, we run all
models in the setting of ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH(1, 1)
and select the best model by the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC), within the adequate models that can
pass various diagnosis tests. If there is no adequate
model in the setting of ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH(1, 1),
then we will try to find the best model by BIC within
the models that can pass various diagnosis tests sub-
sequentially in the settings of ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH
(2, 1), ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH(1, 2), ARMA(p1, q1)
− GARCH(2, 2). If there is still no adequate model in
the setting of ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH(2, 2), then we
skip the analysis for this country in this period. The
motivation for the above procedure is that the model
with a smaller number of parameters are preferred and
typically ARMA(p1, q1) − GARCH(1, 1) is adequate to
produce a satisfactory model. In rare cases, we will have
higher orders in the GARCH part.
APPENDIX B.: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
TABLE B1 Summary statistics of equity return
Country Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-
Bera p-value Obs.
Australia 0.0002 0.0005 0.0881 −0.1598 0.0144 −0.749 12.6115 20,577 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Belgium 0 0.0003 0.1066 −0.1546 0.0145 −0.3835 10.8849 13,648 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Canada 0.0002 0.0007 0.1028 −0.1425 0.0138 −0.6783 12.4423 19,788 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
France 0.0001 0.0005 0.1184 −0.1157 0.0152 −0.0802 9.2711 8,558 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Germany 0.0001 0.0004 0.1159 −0.0964 0.0157 −0.0907 7.7706 4,956 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Hong Kong 0.0003 0.0001 0.1045 −0.1257 0.0134 −0.1331 9.645 9,617 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Ireland −0.0001 0.0001 0.136 −0.1893 0.0172 −0.6845 13.0615 22,422 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Italy −0.0001 0.0002 0.1247 −0.1569 0.0164 −0.2109 9.5727 9,433 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Japan 0.0001 0.0001 0.1227 −0.0951 0.0139 −0.0138 7.9173 5,258 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Malaysia 0.0003 0 0.1797 −0.3697 0.0125 −4.0721 168.9842 6,005,566 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
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TABLE B1 (Continued)
Country Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-
Bera p-value Obs.
Netherlands 0.0001 0.0003 0.1053 −0.1151 0.0145 −0.175 9.3865 8,896 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
New Zealand 0.0001 0.0005 0.102 −0.1007 0.0135 −0.3625 7.1696 3,895 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Singapore 0.0003 0.0003 0.0856 −0.0981 0.0132 −0.1367 7.798 5,022 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
South Africa 0.0003 0.0009 0.1235 −0.1357 0.0178 −0.289 7.1634 3,842 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Spain 0.0001 0.0001 0.1601 −0.1604 0.0166 −0.0631 10.5854 12,516 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Turkey 0.0001 0.0003 0.2202 −0.2742 0.0281 −0.1786 11.0058 13,965 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
United Kingdom 0 0.0003 0.1216 −0.1147 0.0133 −0.2358 12.2133 18,507 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
United States 0.0002 0.0003 0.1104 −0.0951 0.0118 −0.2262 11.5557 15,962 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
TABLE B2 Summary statistics of REITs return
Country Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-
Bera p-value Obs.
Australia 0.0001 0.0004 0.105 −0.1848 0.015 −1.1566 17.8391 49,048 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Belgium 0.0001 0.0003 0.1067 −0.0867 0.0116 −0.0966 8.9083 7,599 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Canada 0.0002 0.0003 0.0852 −0.1183 0.0115 −0.5916 13.3374 23,542 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
France 0.0003 0.0006 0.0955 −0.1036 0.0158 −0.1452 6.8434 2,415 0 3,902 (October 01, 2003–
September 13, 2018)
Germany −0.0001 0.0002 0.2765 −0.2254 0.0246 0.3228 19.2504 31,320 0 2,842 (October 24, 2007–
September 13, 2018)
Hong Kong 0.0004 0 0.1008 −0.1325 0.0117 −0.4057 14.4024 20,178 0 3,706 (July 01, 2004–
September 13, 2018)
Ireland −0.0001 0 0.0564 −0.0764 0.014 −0.1768 5.4248 308 0 1,232 (December 25,
2013–September 13,
2018)
Italy −0.0002 0 0.2267 −0.138 0.0243 0.1446 9.3411 4,504 0 2,683 (June 03, 2008–
September 13, 2018)
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TABLE B2 (Continued)
Country Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Jarque-
Bera p-value Obs.
Japan 0.0002 0.0001 0.106 −0.1181 0.0136 −0.218 11.3108 12,767 0 4,424 (October 01, 2001–
September 13, 2018)
Malaysia 0.0001 0 0.0998 −0.0886 0.0104 0.0636 12.9803 12,855 0 3,097 (November 01,
2006–September 13,
2018)
Mexico −0.0002 0 0.0749 −0.1093 0.0141 −0.4056 7.9165 1,611 0 1,557 (September 26,
2012–September 13,
2018)
Netherlands 0 0.0004 0.0862 −0.0828 0.0138 −0.2967 8.1037 5,741 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
New Zealand 0.0001 0 0.0797 −0.0939 0.0117 −0.5779 7.7619 5,221 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
Singapore 0.0003 0.0002 0.2042 −0.1774 0.0129 0.2813 34.2087 161,085 0 3,968 (July 01, 2003–
September 13, 2018)
South Africa 0 0.0004 0.1426 −0.1491 0.0167 −0.5725 10.8111 9,045 0 3,483 (May 10, 2005–
September 13, 2018)
Spain 0.0001 0 0.0464 −0.175 0.0087 −5.5489 111.9655 1,199,163 0 2,399 (July 06, 2009–
September 13, 2018)
Turkey −0.0007 0 0.1715 −0.1846 0.0263 −0.4955 8.9918 5,029 0 3,272 (March 01, 2006–
September 13, 2018)
United Kingdom −0.0003 0.0001 0.1171 −0.2428 0.0191 −1.0259 16.828 24,680 0 3,031 (Febraury 01,
2007–September 13,
2018)
United States 0.0002 0 0.1712 −0.2195 0.0173 −0.2222 26.3021 118,120 0 5,219 (September 14,
1998–September 13,
2018)
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TABLE B3 Pearson's correlation coefficient between REITs and equity returns in the same country
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Before After Before After Before After Before After
United States 0.32 0.50 0.68 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.65 0.46
Australia 0.67 0.65 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.67
Belgium 0.26 0.24 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.80 0.54 0.61
Canada 0.38 0.33 0.56 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.71 0.68
France — — 0.64 0.79 0.80 0.89 0.77 0.70
Germany — — — — 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.57
Hong Kong — — 0.29 0.58 0.57 0.42 0.54 0.51
Japan — — 0.42 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.46 0.35
The Netherlands 0.23 0.30 0.66 0.78 0.78 0.84 0.63 0.69
New Zealand 0.21 0.38 0.59 0.76 0.75 0.66 0.71 0.65
Singapore — — 0.62 0.74 0.74 0.82 0.80 0.66
United Kingdom — — — — 0.74 0.86 0.77 0.79
Ireland — — — — — — 0.29 0.43
Italy — — — — — — 0.55 0.57
Malaysia — — — — 0.42 0.44 0.72 0.43
Mexico — — — — — — 0.75 0.85
South Africa — — — — 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.85
Spain — — — — — — 0.42 0.72
Turkey — — — — 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.88
Note: This table shows the Pearson's correlation coefficient between REITs and equity market returns within a specific country. The symbol
“—” denotes no available data in that period. The chronology of the four periods are denoted as: Period 1 (dot-com crisis; before: Jan 1,
1998–Mar 10, 2000; after: Mar 11, 2000–Dec 31, 2002), Period 2 (global financial crisis; before: Jan 1, 2005–Aug 8, 2007; after: Aug 9, 2007–
Aug 7, 2009), Period 3 (European sovereign debt crisis; before: Oct 24, 2007–Oct 4, 2009; after: Oct 5, 2009–Jul 31, 2012), and Period 4
(Recent, or Brexit in the UK; before: Jan 1, 2014–Jun 23, 2016; after: Jun 24, 2016–Sep 13, 2018).
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TABLE B4 p-values of the additional bootstrap tests









United States 5.29% 5.69% 87.01% 99.90%
Australia 6.49% 17.98% 11.69% 73.43%
Belgium 19.58% 6.29% 74.53% 99.80%
Canada 17.68% 16.58% 61.64% 91.61%
France 2.20% 0.80% 94.21% 100.00%
Germany † 2.20% 77.52% 100.00%
Hong Kong 86.51% 97.10% 75.12% 82.72%
Japan 91.51% 21.88% 17.78% 30.97%
The Netherlands 11.39% 0.60% 91.81% 100.00%
New Zealand 25.07% 18.18% 15.98% 31.67%
Singapore 5.49% 11.39% 23.38% 98.60%
United Kingdom 13.99% 0.50% † 99.50%
Ireland — 5.19% 19.78% /
Italy — 1.80% 78.62% 99.90%
Malaysia  49.75% 88.81% 27.27%
Mexico — 30.17% 90.71% 93.21%
South Africa 15.58% 14.79% / 86.71%
Spain — /  100.00%
Turkey 18.58% 48.25% 83.92% 98.10%
Note: Strong evidence, that is, p-values less than 5% is highlighted in red background, and weak evidence implied by p-values between 5 and
10% is highlighted in yellow background. The symbol “—” denotes no available data in that period; the symbol “” denotes the non-conver-
gence of the local Gaussian approach; the symbol “/” denotes that no adequate ARMA-GARCH could be obtained for the marginal model;
and the symbol “†” denotes not applicable. The chronology of the four periods are denoted as: Period 1 (dot-com crisis; before: Jan 1, 1998–
Mar 10, 2000; after: Mar 11, 2000–Dec 31, 2002), Period 2 (global financial crisis; before: Jan 1, 2005–Aug 8, 2007; after: Aug 9, 2007–Aug 7,
2009), Period 3 (European sovereign debt crisis; before: Oct 24, 2007–Oct 4, 2009; after: Oct 5, 2009–Jul 31, 2012), and Period 4 (Recent, or
Brexit in the UK; before: Jan 1, 2014–Jun 23, 2016; after: Jun 24, 2016–Sep 13, 2018).
aThis column shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between Germany REITs and REITs in other countries in Period 3.
bThis column shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between Germany REITs and equity markets in different countries in Period 3.
cThis column shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between UK REITs and REITs in other countries in Period 4.
dThis column shows the p-values of the bootstrap test between UK REITs and equity markets in different countries in Period 4.
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